- 17 -
formality without intended economic substance. In addition, such
construction is strengthened still further by fact that the
trust’s having been funded solely with a single piece of real
estate would have made any attempt to effectuate a withdrawal
complex and burdensome at best. While it is not entirely clear
from the document how the provision would operate in this
circumstance, we doubt that any beneficiary would seriously have
contemplated forcing the trustee to sell the home so that he or
she could collect $10,000.
Lastly, we observe that the four cases cited by the estate
in support of its position do not lead us to reach a result
different from that which appears compelled by the facts before
us. In particular, the estate cites United States v. Byrum, 408
U.S. 125 (1972); Estate of Wall v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 300
(1993); Estate of Beckwith v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 242 (1970);
and Estate of Chalmers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1972-158.
However, the principles that the estate asks us to glean from
these cases seem to be drawn primarily from the courts’
discussions of section 2036(a)(2), rather than section
2036(a)(1). We do not dispute that courts have construed the
term “right” as used in section 2036(a)(2) to mean an
ascertainable and legally enforceable power. See United States
v. Byrum, supra at 136; Estate of Wall v. Commissioner, supra at
310-311. Nor do we disagree that the “practical considerations”
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