- 77 - 193-194. By 1962 (year of death), the ratio of unrestricted market price to voting trust formula price had become 10 to 1. See id. at 194. The Commissioner argued that the restrictive provisions should be disregarded in valuing the shares because the voting trust agreement in Reynolds represented a device and was not a bona fide business arrangement under section 20.2031- 2(h), Estate Tax Regs. See id. However, we found that there were bona fide business reasons for the Reynolds voting trust agreement, and that “the large discrepancy between market price per unrestricted share and formula price per unit was not the result of any cleverly devised plan to lower the testamentary value of [decedents’] * * * investments in the company”. Id. at 194-195. Therefore, the voting trust agreement was factored into the determination of fair market value, rather than being completely disregarded. To apply the adequacy of consideration test, courts were required to determine the meaning of the phrase “adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth” used in section 20.2031-2(h), Estate Tax Regs. In Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. at 41 n.9, we concluded that consideration was adequate because the formula price to be paid for a partnership interest represented the fair market value of partnership assets. In Dorn v. United States, 828 F.2d at 181, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed that “Although few cases have relied on Treasury RegulationPage: Previous 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 Next
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