- 82 -
Petitioners assert that the requirements for applying
collateral estoppel articulated in Peck v. Commissioner, 90 T.C.
162, 166-167 (1988), affd. 904 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1990), have
been met; therefore, respondent is precluded from relitigating
those two issues. We disagree. Moreover, petitioners
acknowledge that respondent is not estopped from arguing that the
True companies’ buy-sell agreements were testamentary devices
that were not controlling for estate tax purposes. We agree.
B. Legal Standards for Applying Collateral Estoppel
The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that, once an
issue of fact or law is “actually and necessarily determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive
in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action
involving a party to the prior litigation.” Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)). Collateral estoppel is a
judicial doctrine designed to protect parties from unnecessary
and redundant litigation, to conserve judicial resources, and to
37(...continued)
characterize this as an “evidentiary” fact in the 1971 and 1973
gift tax cases and an “ultimate” fact in the cases at hand. An
evidentiary fact is a fact that is necessary for or leads to the
determination of an ultimate fact. See Black’s Law Dictionary
611 (7th ed. 1999). An ultimate fact is a fact essential to the
claim or the defense. See id. at 612. In Meier v. Commissioner,
91 T.C. 273, 283-286 (1988), the Tax Court regarded the
distinction between ultimate and evidentiary facts as irrelevant
in applying collateral estoppel. See infra pp. 84-85.
Page: Previous 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011