Katherine A. Weir - Page 6




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          Petitioner does not argue, nor would we agree, that military                
          retirement pay is not a pension within the meaning of section               
          61(a)(11).  See, e.g., Eatinger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-           
          310 (stating, without discussion:  “A military retirement                   
          pension, like other pensions, is simply a right to receive a                
          future income stream from the retiree’s employer.”); sec. 1.61-             
          11, Income Tax Regs. (“Pensions and retirement allowances paid              
          either by the Government or by private persons constitute gross             
          income unless excluded by law.”).  Nor does petitioner argue, nor           
          would we agree, that pension payments are not gross income to a             
          divorced spouse who, upon the division of the property of the               
          marital community attendant to the divorce, received the right to           
          those payments as her separate property.  See, e.g., Eatinger v.            
          Commissioner, supra; Lowe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-350.             
               C.  Petitioner’s Argument                                              
               Petitioner relies on the following points:                             
                    At the time of the divorce, the Court ordered that                
               Petitioner’s ex-husband, Robert Mooney, make settlement                
               payments to her in lieu of her community property                      
               interest in the military retirement benefits.  Weir                    
               received cash settlement payments while her ex-husband,                
               Robert Mooney, received the military retirement                        
               benefits as his separate property.  At the time of the                 
               divorce, the equal division of the community was                       
               considered a nontaxable partition of the property.                     
               Whereas, this equal division of the community is                       
               considered a nontaxable partition of the property.                     
               Petitioner’s divorce became final on January 3, 1980.                  
          Petitioner’s view of the facts is that, on that date, an                    






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