Jeffrey H. Weitzman - Page 13




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               Petitioner has the burden of proving that he is not liable             
          for the addition to tax.  Addington v. Commissioner, supra at 58;           
          Goldman v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1994), affg.             
          T.C. Memo. 1993-480; Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757, 791-792            
          (1972).  See generally Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.            
          111, 115 (1933).4                                                           
               Negligence is defined as the failure to exercise the due               
          care that a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would                  
          exercise under the circumstances.  Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.           
          934, 947 (1985).  The pertinent question is whether a particular            
          taxpayer’s actions are reasonable in light of the taxpayer’s                
          experience, the nature of the investment, and the taxpayer’s                
          actions in connection with the transaction.  Henry Schwartz Corp.           
          v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 728, 740 (1973).  The determination of             
          negligence is highly factual.  “When considering the negligence             
          addition, we evaluate the particular facts of each case, judging            
          the relative sophistication of the taxpayers as well as the                 
          manner in which the taxpayers approached their investment.”                 
          Turner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-363.                                
               Petitioner accepts the finding of the Court in Provizer v.             
          Commissioner, supra, that the Sentinel EPE Recyclers had a                  



               4  Cf. sec. 7491(c), effective for court proceedings arising           
          in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998.             
          Petitioner does not contend that his examination commenced after            
          July 22, 1998, or that sec. 7491 is applicable to his case.                 





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