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Rule 142(a)(1). We apply special scrutiny because petitioner had
unfettered control over AIM. See Elec. & Neon, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1324, 1338-1339 (1971), affd. without
published opinion 496 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1974); Haber v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 255, 266 (1969), affd. 422 F.2d 198 (5th
Cir. 1970).
Petitioners contend that the December 31, 1992, promissory
note is evidence of the alleged loan for the Whittington property
and establishes a bona fide debt. We disagree.
The promissory note does not establish the existence of a
bona fide debt, especially where, as here, there is documentary
evidence (discussed below) in conflict with the note. See In re
Lane, 742 F.2d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1984); Stinnett’s Pontiac
Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 730 F.2d 634, 638 (11th Cir. 1984),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1982-314; Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844, 849
(5th Cir. 1969). Petitioner signed the note both as borrower and
lender; there is no evidence that there were arm’s-length
negotiations. The note provides no fixed payment schedule or
maturity date. It provides for annual payment of interest at a
rate of 10 percent per year payable from December 31, 1994, to
December 31, 2000. There is no evidence that petitioner and AIM
had a written loan agreement or discussed security for the
alleged loan, or that AIM maintained records of the alleged debt
or recorded it on its books. There is no evidence that the note
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