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866 (Ala. 1976); 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, sec. 23 (1988); 25
C.J.S., Damages, sec. 2 (1966). A plaintiff may be awarded
compensatory damages for claims of breach of contract,
conversion, conspiracy, or fraudulent inducement. See, e.g.,
Estate of Henderson v. Henderson, 804 So. 2d 191, 192 (Ala.
2001); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 790 So. 2d 922, 927 (Ala.
2000); Williams v. Williams, 786 So. 2d 477, 479 (Ala. 2000).
Those claims do not necessarily include claims on account of
personal injuries or sickness, and did not do so here. Thus, use
of the term “compensatory damages” does not prove that the United
payments to petitioners were on account of personal injuries or
sickness.
Thus, neither the settlement negotiations nor the settlement
agreement proves that United intended to compensate Ervin,
Hudson, or Echols for personal injuries or sickness.
D. United’s Intent
Shaw and Jarrard represented United at the settlement
conference and testified about the settlement agreements.
Petitioners contend that their testimony about United’s intent is
inadmissible parol evidence because the reference in the last
paragraph of the settlement agreement to compensatory damages is
unambiguous and dispositive. We disagree because, as discussed
in paragraph C, above, the term “compensatory damages” in the
last paragraph is not synonymous with “on account of personal
injuries or sickness”. However, even if we did not consider the
testimony of Jarrard and Shaw, our analysis would be unchanged
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