Anthony N. and Marie M. Finazzo - Page 21





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         license agreement demonstrates that the license agreement                    
         canceled, or rendered ineffective, the R&D contract because of the           
         concurrent execution of the two documents.  Accordingly, San                 
         Nicholas was never engaged in, either directly or indirectly, any            
         research or experimentation.  Rather, San Nicholas was merely a              
         passive investor seeking royalty returns pursuant to the license             
         agreement.  See Kellen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-19; Lopez            
         v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-278; Christensen v. Commissioner,           
         T.C. Memo. 2001-185; Serfustini v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-            
         183; Carmena v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-177; Nilsen v.                 
         Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-163;  Fawson v. Commissioner, T.C.             
         Memo. 2000-195.  Any experienced attorney capable of reading and             
         understanding the subject documents should have understood the               
         legal ramifications of the licensing agreement's canceling the R&D           
         agreement.  Petitioner failed to consult an attorney and, further,           
         failed to carefully scrutinize the offering himself.                         
              Second, we are unable to accept uncritically petitioners’               
         contention that petitioner invested in San Nicholas solely to earn           
         a profit.14  Rather, at the time that petitioner signed the                  


               14 It is the duty of the Court to listen to testimony,                 
          observe the demeanor of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and                  
          determine what to believe.  The Court is not required to accept             
          testimony at face value, and the Court may discount a party’s               
          self-interested testimony and place reliance on other evidence              
          that is believed to be more reliable.  See Christensen v.                   
                                                              (continued...)          





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