Framatome Connectors USA, Inc. - Page 29




                                       - 29 -                                         
          corporations not in the ordinary course of business.  Alumax,               
          Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 823.  Alumax could not take any of           
          these six actions without the approval of the majority of the               
          directors elected by the holders of each class of stock.13  Thus,           
          the Japanese shareholders had a veto power over the six areas               
          (six veto powers) because they owned a separate class of stock.             
          The six veto powers reduced Amax’s voting power relative to the             
          voting power of the Japanese shareholders.  Id. at 823.  The                
          Court held in Alumax that the veto powers caused Amax to have               
          less than 80 percent of the voting power.  Id. at 826.                      
               Petitioners contend that the veto powers here were less                
          important than those in Alumax.  We disagree.  A comparison of              
          the veto powers in the instant cases show that they are similar             
          to those in Alumax.  See pp. 11-12, 27-29.                                  



               13  Petitioners point out that, in Alumax, Inc. v.                     
          Commissioner, 165 F.3d 822, 823 (11th Cir. 1999), affg. 109 T.C.            
          133 (1997), if a director elected by a Japanese shareholder                 
          objected to a board action and the Japanese corporation ratified            
          that objection within 14 days, the board vote would be                      
          ineffective, unless a panel of arbitrators ruled within 14 days             
          that the vote would not have a material and adverse effect on the           
          Japanese interests’ investment.  However, petitioners did not               
          discuss how that procedure compares to the arbitration provided             
          by par. j of the 1973 Basic Agreement.  See p. 12.  Further, the            
          U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit said that “On the            
          six matters in which the directors voted by class, moreover, the            
          Amax-elected directors’ voting power effectively declined to                
          50%.”  Id. at 826.  As in the instant cases, the Court of Appeals           
          also said that veto provisions in Alumax, whether or not                    
          exercised, generally discouraged directors from voting against              
          the Japanese interests.  Id. n.4.  Here, because of the six veto            
          powers, Burndy-US did not own more than 50 percent of the voting            
          power of Burndy-Japan.                                                      




Page:  Previous  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011