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as for allocating expenses in prosecuting the lawsuit.8 The
parties agreed that the Glovers would receive 60 percent of any
recovery and would be responsible for 60 percent of the litigation
expenses. The estate would receive the remaining 40 percent of any
recovery and would be responsible for 40 percent of the litigation
expenses.
On November 8, 1995, the court of common pleas entered an
order: (1) Dismissing count I relating to the predeath malpractice
claim, finding that (a) the complaint contained insufficient facts
to establish that Eckell, Sparks played a role in wrongdoings
committed by Mr. Ross and Ms. Hurley, and (b) the Glovers lacked
standing to assert the predeath malpractice claim set forth in
count I of the complaint; (2) dismissing count II, with prejudice,
relating to the recovery of the attorney’s fees the Glovers
incurred in the will contest, finding that the Glovers lacked
standing to assert the claim and that such a claim could not be
asserted separately but rather was a component of the damages
asserted in the main action (i.e., part of the damages resulting
from Eckell, Sparks’s malpractice); (3) dismissing count III
relating to the postdeath negligence claim, finding there were
insufficient facts to establish negligence on the part of Eckell,
8 The agreement recites that the plaintiffs recognized
that it would be extremely difficult to accurately and precisely
allocate between the interests of the Glovers and the estate any
moneys received by way of either a jury verdict or settlement in
the lawsuit pending.
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