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determined from all the facts and circumstances of the case.
Factors to be considered include the details surrounding the
litigation in the underlying proceeding, the allegations contained
in the payee’s complaint and amended complaint in the underlying
proceeding, and the arguments made in the underlying proceeding by
each party. See, e.g., Estate of Morgan v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d
144, 150-151 (5th Cir. 1964), affg. in part and revg. in part 37
T.C. 31 (1961); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1306
(1986), affd. 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988); Bent v. Commissioner, 87
T.C. 236, 245 (1986), affd. 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987). No single
factor is determinative; rather, in a given case, a factor may be
ignored or be deemed persuasive. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, supra
at 1306.
With these principles in mind, we analyze the Eckell, Sparks
settlement agreement.
First, we are mindful that respondent was not a party to the
lawsuit that resulted in the order of the Orphans’ Court requiring
Eckell, Sparks to return the $247,500 in attorney’s fees it
received from the estate. Therefore, res judicata or collateral
estoppel does not apply. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S.
456, 463 (1967). Second, the decision of the Orphans’ Court
requiring Eckell, Sparks to return the fees is not the decision of
the State’s highest court. Consequently, the Orphans’ Court’s
determination of Pennsylvania law is not per se conclusive for
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