Hunt & Sons, Inc. - Page 30




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          We therefore find that the rents petitioner paid on the remaining           
          properties did not exceed the fair market rental values of the              
          properties.                                                                 
          III. Penalties                                                              
               Respondent argues that petitioner should be liable for a 20-           
          percent accuracy-related penalty by reason of petitioner’s                  
          negligence under section 6662(a)(1).  Respondent claims that the            
          magnitude of the discrepancy between the rent paid and the fair             
          market rental value of the properties establishes negligence.               
          Respondent offers no other evidence of negligence than the                  
          magnitude of the discrepancy.12                                             
               Respondent argues that a negligence penalty is mandated                
          where the taxpayer fails to offer credible independent evidence             



               11(...continued)                                                       
          $140,000, $250,000, and $260,000, respectively).  Even using a              
          13-percent “capitalization” rate would result in values of                  
          $410,769, $415,384, and $426,923 for Mosquito Road, Roseville               
          Road and White Rock, respectively.  Under any scenario, Mr.                 
          McIntosh’s “estate-planning” appraisal substantially undervalued            
          the properties.                                                             
               12In connection with additions to tax and penalties, sec.              
          7491(c) places a burden of production on the Commissioner in                
          cases involving examinations commenced after July 22, 1998.                 
          Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,              
          Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 726.  Neither party offered           
          evidence to show when the audit was commenced.  However,                    
          respondent claimed in his pretrial memorandum that the audit was            
          commenced before July 23, 1998, and petitioner in its opening               
          brief appeared to accept the burden of proof.  Whether sec.                 
          7491(c) applies here is irrelevant because petitioner is entitled           
          to prevail on a preponderance of the evidence.                              





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