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1992); see also United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989);
United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684 (1st
Cir. 1997); United States v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418, 1423-1424
(9th Cir. 1995); Gannet v. First Natl. State Bank, 546 F.2d 1072,
1075-1076 (3d Cir. 1976). Conversely, State attorney-client
privilege rules apply where the underlying cause of action rests
on State law. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32
F.3d 851, 861-862 (3d Cir. 1994).
Petitioners argue that the cases at bar involve the latter
situation. Petitioners claim:
The issue here is not whether Petitioner has
waived his attorney-client privilege in the within U.S.
Tax Court proceeding involving federal statutes of the
Internal Revenue Code. The issue here is whether
Petitioner waived his attorney-client privilege in
Fitzsimon v. S.C.Equestrian, et al, a 1994 State Court
proceeding involving causes of action under the laws of
the State of California. * * *
We, however, disagree. The matter before us is a
redetermination of petitioners’ Federal income tax liabilities
under Title 26 of the United States Code. It therefore falls
squarely within the above-described parameters for an
adjudication of Federal law.
Moreover, contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, the issue
here is precisely whether the privilege has been waived for
purposes of this Tax Court proceeding, regardless of whether it
was waived for purposes of earlier litigation in California.
Although certain of respondent’s bases for contending that the
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