Ronald J. Lutz, Jr. and Paula M. Lutz - Page 17




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          have purchased only winning tickets, the Court applied the rule             
          of Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), to estimate           
          the amount of the taxpayer’s gambling losses.                               
               Unlike Doffin v. Commissioner, supra, this is not a case               
          where the taxpayers had few assets, no income apart from                    
          gambling, and no significant accessions to wealth during the year           
          at issue.  Petitioners have admitted to an increase in their net            
          worth for 1996 that corresponds roughly to the amount of                    
          unreported gambling income that respondent has determined.                  
          Petitioners introduced into evidence unaudited statements of                
          financial position, purporting to show the change in their net              
          worth during 1996.  These documents indicate that during 1996               
          petitioners’ net worth increased by $89,503 (from $542,275 to               
          $631,778).  These documents indicate that during 1996 petitioners           
          purchased, among other things, a new Chevrolet Suburban and a               
          motorcycle, and that the value of their interest in Mega                    
          increased by some $70,000 during 1996.13  In short, we are unable           
          to conclude on the basis of the evidence in the record that                 
          petitioners’ significant accessions to wealth in 1996 were not              



               13 Although petitioners testified that they did not put any            
          gambling winnings into Mega, we note that in 1996 Mega paid Laura           
          $24,000, even though she performed no services for Mega.  In this           
          regard, Paula testified that Mega “paid my husband and I, since             
          we owned the company * * * they wrote us a check.  But I didn’t             
          do anything.”  These peculiar circumstances raise the suggestion,           
          if not the likelihood, that Mega’s assets and petitioners’                  
          separate assets were to some degree fungible.                               





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