- 18 -
relies, there was a pending “global” transaction for the purchase
and sale of all the stock of a corporation at the time of the
gift or transfer at issue. He then surmises that because
Carrington and Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra, did not involve a pending
“global” transaction, the legal principles of those authorities
do not apply. Instead, he argues that we must apply the
principles of the cases he relies upon, and, accordingly, we must
conduct a detailed factual inquiry for purposes of determining
whether the sale of the stock warrants had ripened to a practical
certainty at the time of the assignments.
We cannot agree that respondent has effectively
distinguished Carrington and Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra, on their
facts. First, neither this Court nor the Courts of Appeals have
adopted respondent’s theory of a pending “global” transaction as
a means of distinguishing cases such as Carrington and Palmer v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684 (1974). Indeed, the caselaw in this
area applies essentially the same anticipatory assignment of
income principles to cases of a “global” nature as those
applicable to cases of a “nonglobal” nature. See, e.g., Greene
v. United States, supra at 581. We can only interpret
respondent’s use of the phrase “pending global transaction” as
simply a restatement of the principles contained in the cases
upon which he relies. Thus, we cannot agree that respondent’s
reliance on a pending global transaction distinguishes either
Page: Previous 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011