Gerald A. and Henrietta V. Rauenhorst - Page 36




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          that this triggered the antidilution provision of the NMG                   
          warrants.17  That provision is:                                             
               if a purchase, tender or exchange offer shall have been                
               made to and accepted by the holders of more than 50% of                
               the outstanding shares of Capital Stock, and if the                    
               holder of such Warrants so designates in a notice given                
               to the Company, the holder of such Warrants shall be                   
               entitled to receive in lieu thereof, the highest amount                
               of securities or other property to which such holder                   
               would actually have been entitled as a shareholder if                  
               such holder had exercised such Warrants prior to the                   
               expiration of such purchase, tender or exchange offer                  
               and accepted such offer * * *                                          
          However, the letter of intent was not an offer; it was neither a            
          purchase, tender, or exchange offer as the antidilution provision           
          specifies.  Further, Ewel Grossberg, Randolph K. Ginsberg, Jim              
          Cooper, and John Woodlock did not accept and agree to the                   
          conditions stated in the letter of intent in their capacities as            
          shareholders of NMG.  Instead, they did so in their capacities as           
          officers of NMG, thus obligating NMG to some of the preliminary             
          matters stated in the letter of intent.  Moreover, the                      
          antidilution provisions cannot be construed to legally bind the             
          warrantholders to sell their warrants to NMG or WCP.  Those                 
          provisions, on the contrary, protect the warrantholders and give            
          them the option of participating on the same terms as the                   
          majority shareholders.                                                      

               17Those individuals would continue to hold 68.69 percent of            
          NMG’s outstanding capital stock if all outstanding preferred were           
          treated as common shares and all NMG warrants were exercised.               
          Respondent contends that this approach would be consistent with             
          the antidilution provision in the NMG warrants.                             





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