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This Court, however, finds that petitioner’s citations are to
provisions that are not in the nature of a workers’ compensation
act, and they do not support his position that the CBA had the
“force and effect of law.” Sec. 1.104-1(b), Income Tax Regs.
Furthermore, while petitioner’s citations refer to other possible
sources of injury payments, they do not change the fact that the
payments herein were made pursuant to the CBA, not a legislative
act.
The agreement between the City and the Union was not
incorporated by reference into legislation, it was merely
approved by the City ordinance. Thus, the CBA stands by itself
as a contract between the City and the Union. The agreement does
not have the force and effect of law and is modifiable at any
time. See Rutter v. Commissioner, supra at 468 (labor contract
does not qualify as a “statute” within the meaning of sec. 1.104-
1(b), Income Tax Regs.); Covert v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-
598. The finding that the CBA does not qualify as a “statute”
within the meaning of sec. 1.104-1(b), Income Tax Regs., is
determinative of the outcome in this case. As a result, it is
not necessary for us to decide whether the relevant provisions of
the CBA are in the nature of a workers’ compensation act.
We hold that petitioner did not receive disability payments
under a workers’ compensation act or a statute in the nature of a
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