- 16 -
Fed. Appx. 351 (6th Cir. 2001); sec. 170(a)(1), (f)(8); sec.
1.170A-13, Income Tax Regs.; see also Estate of Wood v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1, 6 (1962) (“not every payment to an
organization which qualifies as a charity is a charitable
contribution”); Saba v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1980-199;
Arceneaux v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1977-363; Nelson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1974-239.
In particular, petitioner introduced no meaningful evidence
that would substantiate the making of noncash charitable
contributions in any amount.9 Nor did petitioner introduce any
evidence whatsoever that would substantiate a charitable
contribution carryover from a prior taxable year(s). The law is
clear: The fact that a taxpayer reports a deduction on the
taxpayer’s income tax return is not sufficient to substantiate
the deduction claimed on the return. Wilkinson v. Commissioner,
71 T.C. 633, 639 (1979); Roberts v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 834,
837 (1974). A tax return is merely a statement of the taxpayer’s
claim; the return is not presumed to be correct. Wilkinson v.
Commissioner, supra; Roberts v. Commissioner, supra; see Seaboard
Commercial Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1034, 1051 (1957) (a
9 At trial, the only evidence introduced by petitioner
regarding purported noncash contributions was a 3- by 5-inch
printed card from United Cancer Research Society that appears to
be designed principally to explain to prospective donors why
their “discards” cannot be accepted for donation, e.g., “articles
require too much repair” or “driver unable to determine what is
to go”. In any event, the card is undated and bears no
indication what property may have been offered for donation.
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