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sanctions under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1927 (1988) are appropriate where
the attorney conduct multiplying the proceedings was reckless.
B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1107 (9th Cir. 2002);
Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Associated Convalescent Enters., Inc., 766 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.
1985). Because we are uncertain of appellate venue, and because
we find that petitioner’s counsel’s conduct would constitute bad
faith under the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cases
applying a bad faith standard, e.g., In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec.
Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996), we shall, for purposes
of this case (and without deciding the standard in this Court)
(and without deciding the standard in this Court), adopt that
standard. See Nis Family Trust v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 548.
2. Bad Faith
a. Petitioner’s Initial Arguments
In the view of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
“bad faith” is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly
raises a frivolous argument. In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec.
Litig., supra; Estate of Blas v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 858, 860 (9th
Cir. 1986). As discussed supra in section III.A., both
petitioner’s initial arguments and the 861 argument are
frivolous. We recognize that petitioner originally appeared in
this case pro se. Mr. Sulla appeared on June 21, 2000, at the
time of the 2000 trial session. At that time, he was advised by
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