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Inc., 519 F.2d 777, 779 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)). Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has said that, in determining the existence of actual
malice in a defamation action: “[R]ecklessness may be found
where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the
informant or the accuracy of his reports.” St. Amant v.
Thompson, supra at 732. In the same paragraph, the Court also
says that a defendant is not likely to prevail “when the
publisher’s allegations are so inherently improbable that only a
reckless man would have put them in circulation.” Id. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has likewise determined that the
scienter necessary to show “deliberate recklessness” in a civil
securities fraud action is shown when the danger of misleading
customers “‘is either known to the defendant or is so obvious
that the actor must have been aware of it.’” In re Silicon
Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 975-977 (9th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569
(9th Cir. 1990), for definition of reckless conduct). The
reckless disregard inquiry appropriate for determining actual
malice in a defamation action, like the deliberate recklessness
inquiry appropriate in a civil securities fraud action, is an
appropriate model for determining whether Mr. Sulla recklessly
raised a frivolous argument, since common to all three inquiries
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