Joseph T. Tornichio - Page 13




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               3.   Notice and Demand                                                 
               Petitioner contends that he did not receive a notice and               
          demand for payment for any of the 3 tax years at issue as                   
          required by section 6303(a), which provides in pertinent part:              
                    SEC. 6303(a). General Rule.-–Where it is not                      
               otherwise provided by this title, the Secretary shall,                 
               as soon as practicable, and within 60 days, after the                  
               making of an assessment of a tax pursuant to section                   
               6203, give notice to each person liable for the unpaid                 
               tax, stating the amount and demanding payment thereof.                 
               * * *                                                                  
               “The form on which a notice of assessment and demand for               
          payment is made is irrelevant as long as it provides the taxpayer           
          with all the information required under 26 U.S.C. � 6303(a).”               
          Elias v. Connett, 908 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1990).                        
               The TXMODA transcripts in the record show that for each year           
          at issue, respondent sent petitioner both an initial notice and             
          demand and, subsequently, a final notice and demand.  In                    
          addition, petitioner received numerous notices of intent to levy,           
          as well as notices of deficiency.  These numerous notices                   
          sufficed to meet the section 6303(a) requirements.  See Hughes v.           
          United States, 953 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1992); Standifird v.             
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-245; Weishan v. Commissioner,                 
          supra.                                                                      
               For the foregoing reasons, we sustain respondent’s                     
          determination as to the proposed levy as a permissible exercise             
          of discretion.                                                              






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