Estate of Charles N. Aronson, Deceased, Barney P. Aronson, Executor - Page 34

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          Estate of Nicholson v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 666, 681-682 (1990)            
          (citations omitted).                                                        
               Pursuant to section 2056(a), the estate may claim, as a                
          marital deduction, the value of property passing to the surviving           
          spouse.  As a general rule, the marital deduction is denied for a           
          “terminable interest”.  Estate of Nicholson v. Commissioner,                
          supra at 671.  A “terminable interest”, generally, is a property            
          interest that will terminate or fail “on the lapse of time, on              
          the occurrence of an event or contingency, or on the failure of             
          an event or contingency to occur”.  Sec. 2056(b)(1).  An interest           
          in the nature of a life estate, therefore, is ineligible for the            
          marital deduction pursuant to section 2056(b)(5).  Estate of                
          Nicholson v. Commissioner, supra at 671-672.                                
               The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. 97-34,           
          95 Stat. 172, modified the rules for the marital deduction                  
          relating to terminable interests.  ERTA sec. 403(d)(1), 95 Stat.            
          302, added section 2056(b)(7), which allows a marital deduction             


               5(...continued)                                                        
          In the context of sec. 7491, by failing to raise the sec. 7491(a)           
          argument at or before trial, petitioner prejudiced respondent’s             
          ability to present evidence that petitioner did not meet the                
          requirements of sec. 7491(a)--e.g., that petitioner did not                 
          comply with the substantiation requirements or that petitioner              
          was not cooperative.                                                        
               We note, however, because we make our determination on the             
          basis of the evidence in the record rather than on a failure to             
          carry the burden of proof by a party bearing the burden, our                
          decision in this case does not depend on which party bears the              
          burden of proof.                                                            




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