- 38 - effectuated as far as is consonant with principles of law and public policy.” In re Fabbri, 140 N.E.2d 269, 271 (N.Y. 1957). It is the duty of the Court to carry out the testator’s purpose, notwithstanding that general rules of interpretation might point to a different result. In re Bieley, supra; In re Fabbri, supra at 271. The testator’s intent is to be ascertained not from a single word or phrase, but from a sympathetic reading of the will as an entirety and in view of all the facts and circumstances under which the provisions of the will were framed. In re Bieley, supra; In re Fabbri, supra; see In re Selner, supra. A sympathetic reading of the will in its entirety in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances, however, is distinguishable from the use of extrinsic evidence to gauge testamentary intent. Extrinsic evidence is inadmissible in the absence of an ambiguity in the will. In re Bieley, supra at 1123 n.2; In re Fabbri, supra at 274. If a dominant purpose or plan of distribution is discernable from the will, the individual parts of the will must be read in relation to that purpose and given effect accordingly. In re Fabbri, supra at 271. Under the terms of the trust at issue (i.e., in the 1993 will), Jo is not “entitled to all the income from the property, payable annually or at more frequent intervals” as is required by section 2056(b)(7). See Estate of Nicholson v. Commissioner, 94Page: Previous 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 Next
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