Bank One Corporation - Page 112

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          however, the statute itself clearly directed the Treasury                   
          Department to prescribe specific regulations as to the matter in            
          question in order to effect congressional intent.  Here, by                 
          contrast, we find in the statute no clear direction from Congress           
          to the Treasury Department to prescribe rules valuing financial             
          derivatives, let alone a direction to prescribe those rules as a            
          precondition to effecting congressional intent as to section 475.           
          The fact that regulations have not been issued on the valuation             
          matter at hand does not provide FNBC with a basis to thwart                 
          Congress’s mandate to value swaps at fair market value.  Intl.              
          Multifoods Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 579, 587 (1997) (and             
          cases cited thereat).                                                       
               Nor do we agree with petitioner that the legislative history           
          of section 475 indicates that taxpayers are allowed to implement            
          under section 475 any “reasonable” method until the Treasury                
          Department exercises its regulatory authority.61  We trace the              
          history of section 475 to the Treasury Department’s concern that            
          certain existing tax rules applicable to securities dealers                 
          appeared overly favorable when compared with GAAP.  The specific            
          concern, as stated in the President’s Budget Proposal, see                  
          Department of the Treasury, General Explanation of the                      
          President’s Budget Proposals Affecting Receipts 89-90 (Jan. 30,             


          61 Petitioner relies erroneously on First Chicago Corp. v.                  
          Commissioner, 88 T.C. 663 (1987), affd. 842 F.2d 180 (7th Cir.              
          1988), for a contrary proposition.                                          




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