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custody of the child between parents for definite periods. We
disagree and consider such a construction to be wholly
inconsistent with the underlying rationale for section 152(e).
See McClendon v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1, 3 (1980); Yancey v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 37, 40 (1979); Knight v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1992-710, affd. without published opinion 29 F.3d (9th Cir.
1994).
To the extent that the agreement and the order contain
schedules that allocate Shelby’s physical custody between
petitioner and Mr. Beeghly for specific periods, the days
included within those periods are counted, respectively, as days
of physical custody for either petitioner or Mr. Beeghly for
purposes of section 152(e). With the exception of the 1997
holidays, it is irrelevant which parent had actual, physical
custody of Shelby on any given day during the years in issue.
As we view the matter, actual, physical custody of the child
is relevant for purposes of section 152(e) only if the “split”,
joint, or shared custody instrument does not allocate physical
custody between the parents for specific periods, but, as in this
case for the 1997 holidays, leaves it up to the parents of the
child to decide which will have physical custody on certain days.
Consequently, we turn our attention to the 1997 holidays.
The parties agree that petitioner had actual, physical
custody of Shelby on New Year’s Day, Easter, and Thanksgiving.
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