Curtis R. and Lynn Bitker - Page 30

                                       - 30 -                                         
               Respondent argues on brief that, pursuant to the principle             
          known as duty of consistency, petitioners are bound as to the               
          amounts of the capital accounts and distributions reported on the           
          1991 return.  We disagree.                                                  
               A taxpayer is under a duty of consistency when:                        
               (1) the taxpayer has made a representation or reported an              
               item for tax purposes in one year,                                     
               (2) the Commissioner has acquiesced in or relied on that fact          
               for that year, and                                                     
               (3) the taxpayer desires to change the representation,                 
               previously made, in a later year after the statute of                  
               limitations on assessments bars adjustments for the initial            
               tax year. * * * [Beltzer v. United States, 495 F.2d 211, 212           
               (8th Cir. 1974).]                                                      
          The duty of consistency is an affirmative defense that should be            
          raised in pleadings before trial.  Sec. 7453; Rule 39; LeFever v.           
          Commissioner, 100 F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1996), affg. 103 T.C. 525             
          (1994).  In the instant case, respondent’s answer contained no              
          affirmative defenses or any allegation that respondent has relied           
          upon the capital accounts and distributions reported on the 1991            
          Schedules K-1.  Consequently, because the duty of consistency is an         
          affirmative defense and was not pleaded by respondent, nor tried by         
          consent of the parties, it is deemed waived.  Rule 39; Monahan v.           
          Commissioner, 109 T.C. 235, 250 (1997); Green v. Commissioner, T.C.         
          Memo. 1998-274 (collateral estoppel), affd. without published               
          opinion 201 F.3d 447 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Gustafson v.                
          Commissioner, 97 T.C. 85, 89-92 (1991) (if an affirmative defense           






Page:  Previous  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011