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interest in petitioner’s IRA. See sec. 414(p)(1)(A). Petitioner
initiated, received, and controlled the distribution from his
IRA, which funds he used to comply with the divorce judgment.
Since petitioner was the plan participant and the distribution
was made directly to him, petitioner was not an alternate payee.
See sec. 414(p)(8). In addition, petitioner never submitted a
copy of the divorce judgment to the plan administrator prior to
requesting and receiving the distribution from the IRA.
Therefore, the divorce judgment does not qualify as a QDRO under
section 414(p).
Since petitioner is not an alternate payee and the section
414(p) requirements for a QDRO were not met, petitioner does not
fall within the section 72(t)(2)(C) exception to the section
72(t) additional tax on an early distribution from a qualified
retirement plan.
Perhaps realizing he may not prevail under the language of
section 414(p), petitioner claims that the facts in this case
indicate compliance with the QDRO provisions within the spirit of
the law. Where the requirements of a statute relate to the
substance or essence of the statute, they must be rigidly
observed. Taylor v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1071, 1077 (1977);
Sperapani v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 308, 331 (1964). On the other
hand, if the requirements are procedural or directory in that
they do not go to the essence of the thing to be done, but rather
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Last modified: May 25, 2011