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are given with a view to the orderly conduct of business, they
may be fulfilled by substantial compliance. Taylor v.
Commissioner, supra at 1077-1078; Sperapani v. Commissioner,
supra at 330-331.
We need not address whether all the requirements of section
414(p) go to the essence of the statute or are merely procedural
because we find that the divorce judgment and petitioner’s
actions fail to comply substantially with the QDRO requirements
in section 414(p). See Rodoni v. Commissioner, supra at 39-40.
Petitioner never submitted a copy of the divorce judgment to
the plan administrator for a determination, nor was he even
required by the divorce judgment to pay the ordered obligations
from his IRA. The divorce judgment fails to name Ms. Bougas as
an alternate payee, fails to specify clearly an amount or
percentage of petitioner’s IRA that was to be paid by the plan to
Ms. Bougas, and fails to create or recognize any rights of Ms.
Bougas to receive any portion of petitioner’s IRA. See sec.
414(p)(1) and (2). In direct conflict with the requirements of
section 414(p), the divorce judgment explicitly states that the
IRA is petitioner’s sole and exclusive property, free and clear
of any claims of Ms. Bougas. Clearly, the divorce judgment did
not substantially comply with the section 414(p) QDRO
requirements.
Petitioner further claims that he should not be penalized
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