- 16 -
history of the provision, as well as of constructions of similar
enactments by other States. Id. at 1037-1041. The Court of
Appeals then concluded:
we think the language of � 285(b)(3), the definitions
incorporated by the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers
Act, and the decisions construing analogous state
probate codes, all demonstrate that the California
legislature intended to prohibit the disclaimer of an
interest accepted through conduct by a beneficiary
implying an intent to direct or control the property in
a manner that conveys more than a de minimis benefit to
the beneficiary or a third party. * * * Application of
this standard is a fact-sensitive inquiry that centers
on the conduct of the beneficiary, and the result of
such conduct. [Id. at 1039.]
Applying the just-described rule to the facts before it, the
Court of Appeals held that the debtor’s declaration of an
interest in the disputed trust on several loan applications
constituted an acceptance of his contingent interest in the trust
assets. Id. at 1041. Further, according to the appellate court:
“That acceptance of ‘part’ of the contingent interest thus made
his later disclaimer ineffective under � 285(b)(3) of the
California Probate Code, because acceptance of a part of, or
benefit under, the interest constitutes acceptance of the
interest in its entirety.” Id.
Here, the Court is satisfied that decedent would be
considered under California law to have accepted her interest in,
and power of appointment over, all of the assets contained in
Trust A. Decedent executed a power of appointment which on its
face provides for disposition of the assets of Trust A in their
Page: Previous 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011