- 20 - estate alleges that because the power of appointment simply applied “to whatever property happens to be in Trust A on the death of Leona and might not apply to any of Samuel’s property”, nothing in the document’s execution signaled that decedent claimed ownership of Mr. Engelman’s property. Yet our focus is not on when the power was executed but on the date of decedent’s death when it became effective. When decedent died without having revoked or limited the document, and the power on its face disposed of all property in Trust A now alleged to be part of her gross estate, she asserted control over all the relevant assets. In the alternative, the estate seeks to avoid the result stemming from characterization of the February 5, 1998, document as the exercise of a power of appointment that became effective at decedent’s death by arguing that, on account of the extent of her rights in Trust A, decedent could not have held or exercised a power of appointment. The estate’s contentions are founded in large part on the State law doctrine of merger. Generally, where an equitable and legal estate become united in a single person, i.e., where the sole beneficiary is also the sole trustee, the two interests merge and the trust terminates. Nellis v. Rickard, 66 P. 32, 33 (Cal. 1901); 60 Cal. Jur. 3d, Trusts, sec. 286. The estate alleges: “Because Samuel left his property to Trust A where Leona had an immediate and unrestricted right of withdrawal, there was no restriction on Leona’s current interestPage: Previous 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011