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estate alleges that because the power of appointment simply
applied “to whatever property happens to be in Trust A on the
death of Leona and might not apply to any of Samuel’s property”,
nothing in the document’s execution signaled that decedent
claimed ownership of Mr. Engelman’s property. Yet our focus is
not on when the power was executed but on the date of decedent’s
death when it became effective. When decedent died without
having revoked or limited the document, and the power on its face
disposed of all property in Trust A now alleged to be part of her
gross estate, she asserted control over all the relevant assets.
In the alternative, the estate seeks to avoid the result
stemming from characterization of the February 5, 1998, document
as the exercise of a power of appointment that became effective
at decedent’s death by arguing that, on account of the extent of
her rights in Trust A, decedent could not have held or exercised
a power of appointment. The estate’s contentions are founded in
large part on the State law doctrine of merger. Generally, where
an equitable and legal estate become united in a single person,
i.e., where the sole beneficiary is also the sole trustee, the
two interests merge and the trust terminates. Nellis v. Rickard,
66 P. 32, 33 (Cal. 1901); 60 Cal. Jur. 3d, Trusts, sec. 286.
The estate alleges: “Because Samuel left his property to
Trust A where Leona had an immediate and unrestricted right of
withdrawal, there was no restriction on Leona’s current interest
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