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decedent’s disposition of the Trust A corpus by means of her
power of appointment became irrevocable at her death and cannot,
on account of the relation-back doctrine, be disregarded.
Decedent acted to transfer the property of Trust A to those named
in her power of appointment, rather than to Trust B and its
beneficiaries. Ms. Mattson’s actions to do otherwise cannot be
attributed to decedent.
As pertains to the gift to the State of Israel, caselaw is
contrary to the estate’s position. The donor, not the donee,
must restrict use of the gift to charitable purposes. The
foregoing principle has been recognized by Federal courts both in
construing the predecessor of section 2055 in the Revenue Act of
1926, ch. 27, sec. 303, 44 Stat. 72, and in interpreting section
2055 itself. See Contl. Ill. Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, 185 Ct. Cl. 642, 403 F.2d 721 (1968); Levey v. Smith, 103
F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1939). As stated in an early pronouncement:
Plaintiff urges that the statutory test “is the
use to which the property is to be put.” In our view
the test is: For what purpose is the property devised?
Consequently, a declaration by the donee that property
will be used for a charitable purpose cannot determine
the use for which it was bequeathed. It is the act of
the testator that determines, for purposes of
deduction, whether gifts or contributions which have
been bequeathed to a legatee “are to be used”
exclusively for religious, charitable and educational
purposes. We do not hold that parol evidence is not
admissible for the purpose of showing that a bequest,
absolute on its face, was in fact intended by the
testator and understood by the legatee to be burdened
by a trust. But such evidence to be material must
relate to words or acts of the testator and must tend
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