- 9 -
Analysis
In interpreting a statute, we start as always with the
language of the statute itself. Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). We look to the
legislative history primarily to learn the purpose of the statute
and to resolve any ambiguity in the words contained in the text.
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 69, 89 (2003); Allen
v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 1, 7 (2002). If the language of the
statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, we generally apply it
according to its terms. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); Burke v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 41, 59
(1995). If the statute is ambiguous or silent, we may look to
the statute’s legislative history to determine congressional
intent. Burlington N. R.R. v. Okla. Tax Commn., 481 U.S. 454,
461 (1987); Ewing v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 494, 503 (2002).
DEFRA section 177(d)(2)(A) does not specifically state that
the adjusted basis for purposes of determining gain provided
therein is also to be used for purposes of amortizing
petitioner’s intangibles held on January 1, 1985. The
legislative history likewise does not contain a specific
expression of congressional intent with respect to the
amortization of intangibles. The conference report states
simply:
The Senate amendment includes special basis rules
designed to ensure that, to the extent possible, pre-
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011