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317 (9th Cir. 1962), affg. 32 T.C. 998 (1959) and First W. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1017 (1959); Boulez v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 209, 214-215 (1981), affd. 810 F.2d 209
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Estate of Emerson v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 612,
617 (1977). The rationale for this rule of law has been
articulated as follows:
the tendency against Government estoppel is
particularly strong where the official’s conduct
involves questions of essentially legislative
significance, as where he conveys a false impression of
the laws of the country. Obviously, Congress’s
legislative authority should not be readily
subordinated to the action of a wayward or
unknowledgeable administrative official. Accordingly,
the general proposition has been that the estoppel
doctrine is inapplicable to prevent the Commissioner
from correcting a mistake of law. See Automobile Club
v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 [, 183-184 (1957)]. [Fn.
ref. and further citations omitted.]
Schuster v. Commissioner, supra at 317. In short, “the policy in
favor of an efficient collection of the public revenue outweighs
the policy of the estoppel doctrine in its usual and customary
context.” Id.
Although we can appreciate petitioners’ frustration, the
fact of the matter is that the events of the present case do not
provide a basis for estopping respondent from collecting an
erroneous refund paid in respect of what respondent concedes was
petitioners’ properly reported tax liability for the year in
issue. See Kronish v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 684, 695-697 (1988);
Century Data Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 157, 165 (1986);
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