James and Katie Gill - Page 7




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          317 (9th Cir. 1962), affg. 32 T.C. 998 (1959) and First W. Bank &           
          Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1017 (1959); Boulez v.                   
          Commissioner, 76 T.C. 209, 214-215 (1981), affd. 810 F.2d 209               
          (D.C. Cir. 1987); Estate of Emerson v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 612,           
          617 (1977).  The rationale for this rule of law has been                    
          articulated as follows:                                                     
               the tendency against Government estoppel is                            
               particularly strong where the official’s conduct                       
               involves questions of essentially legislative                          
               significance, as where he conveys a false impression of                
               the laws of the country.  Obviously, Congress’s                        
               legislative authority should not be readily                            
               subordinated to the action of a wayward or                             
               unknowledgeable administrative official.  Accordingly,                 
               the general proposition has been that the estoppel                     
               doctrine is inapplicable to prevent the Commissioner                   
               from correcting a mistake of law.  See Automobile Club                 
               v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 [, 183-184 (1957)]. [Fn.                 
               ref. and further citations omitted.]                                   
          Schuster v. Commissioner, supra at 317.  In short, “the policy in           
          favor of an efficient collection of the public revenue outweighs            
          the policy of the estoppel doctrine in its usual and customary              
          context.”  Id.                                                              
               Although we can appreciate petitioners’ frustration, the               
          fact of the matter is that the events of the present case do not            
          provide a basis for estopping respondent from collecting an                 
          erroneous refund paid in respect of what respondent concedes was            
          petitioners’ properly reported tax liability for the year in                
          issue.  See Kronish v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 684, 695-697 (1988);           
          Century Data Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 157, 165 (1986);           






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