- 41 -
also S. Rept. 99-313, at 209, 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 1, 209 (“The
IRS may define a ministerial act in regulations.”). This
consistency between section 301.6404-2T(b)(1), Temporary Proced.
& Admin. Regs., supra, and the legislative history of section
6404(e) satisfies the concern that we might otherwise have had
about the regulation. Cf. Minahan v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 492,
505 (1987) (stating:
When the regulation interpreting a statute is written by the
very agency whose “abusive actions or overreaching” were
intended to be deterred by that statute, we must be
especially vigilant to insure that the regulation
“harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its
origins, and its purpose.” Durbin Paper Stock Co. v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C. [252,] at 257 [(1983)].).
We apply the foregoing first to the events of the first
period (December 2, 1993, through October 26, 1994), then to the
events of the second period (December 14, 1994, through May 2,
1995), and finally to the events of unspecified additional
periods.
A. First Period (Dec. 2, 1993, through Oct. 26, 1994)
Petitioners contend as follows on brief:
Respondent’s actions to calculate the deficiency and to
transmit decision documents to Petitioners should have taken
no more than ten days. Even so, Respondent’s Appeals Office
did not send a decision document to Petitioners for their
signature until October 26, 1994. The time period for this
ministerial action to be completed by Respondent encompassed
10 months and 24 days, after Petitioners’ transmittal of
their canceled checks to Respondent. Such delay in
performing a simple ministerial act warrants abatement of
the interest accruing during the period December 2, 1993 to
October 26, 1994.
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