- 6 - U.S. 540, 547 (1983), which presumption has been described as “particularly strong”, Nammack v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1379, 1385 (1971), affd. per curiam 459 F.2d 1045 (2nd Cir. 1972); see Black v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 505, 507-508 (1977). Generally, statutory classifications are valid if they bear a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, supra. A higher level of scrutiny is applied if a statute interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech, or employs a suspect classification, such as race. See, e.g., id.; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980). Congress's power to categorize and classify for tax purposes is extremely broad. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, supra; Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973); Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 26 (1916); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 158 (1911); see also Barter v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239, 1240 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (statutory difference in tax rates for married couples and single individuals does not violate Due Process of law of the Fifth Amendment; “perfect equality or absolute logical consistency between persons subject to the Internal Revenue Code * * * [is not] a constitutional sine qua non”). In Regan v. Taxation With Representation, supra at 547-548, the Supreme CourtPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Next
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