- 9 - not depend on the type of claim made. [H. Rept. 104- 586, at 143 (1996), 1996-3 C.B. 331, 481.] The distinction made by section 104(a)(2) between personal physical injury or sickness and nonphysical personal injury or sickness is rationally related to the objectives articulated in that section’s legislative history, as quoted above. See also H. Conf. Rept. 104-737, at 300 (1996), 1996-3 C.B. 741, 1040. Consequently, section 104(a)(2), as amended in 1996, is constitutional. Finally, we observe that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recently upheld section 104(a)(2), as amended in 1996, from constitutional attack on equal protection grounds. Young v. United States, 332 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 2003). In that case, the Court of Appeals concluded as follows: The legislature has particularly broad discretion in creating distinctions in tax statutes * * * and “is not bound to tax every member of a class or none. It may make distinctions of degree having a rational basis, and when subjected to judicial scrutiny they must be presumed to rest on that basis if there is any conceivable state of facts which would support it.” Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937) (citations omitted). “The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940). In this case, the plaintiff is simply unable to overcome this difficult burden. As the district court noted in dismissing his complaint, Congress sought to establish a uniform policy regarding taxation of damages awards and to reduce the amount of litigation regarding whether damage awards were taxable. * * * The distinction between physical and non-physical injury is rationally related to these articulated governmentPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Next
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