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not depend on the type of claim made. [H. Rept. 104-
586, at 143 (1996), 1996-3 C.B. 331, 481.]
The distinction made by section 104(a)(2) between personal
physical injury or sickness and nonphysical personal injury or
sickness is rationally related to the objectives articulated in
that section’s legislative history, as quoted above. See also
H. Conf. Rept. 104-737, at 300 (1996), 1996-3 C.B. 741, 1040.
Consequently, section 104(a)(2), as amended in 1996, is
constitutional.
Finally, we observe that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has recently upheld section 104(a)(2), as amended in
1996, from constitutional attack on equal protection grounds.
Young v. United States, 332 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 2003). In that
case, the Court of Appeals concluded as follows:
The legislature has particularly broad discretion in
creating distinctions in tax statutes * * * and “is not
bound to tax every member of a class or none. It may
make distinctions of degree having a rational basis,
and when subjected to judicial scrutiny they must be
presumed to rest on that basis if there is any
conceivable state of facts which would support it.”
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495,
509 (1937) (citations omitted). “The burden is on the
one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative
every conceivable basis which might support it.”
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
In this case, the plaintiff is simply unable to
overcome this difficult burden. As the district court
noted in dismissing his complaint, Congress sought to
establish a uniform policy regarding taxation of
damages awards and to reduce the amount of litigation
regarding whether damage awards were taxable. * * * The
distinction between physical and non-physical injury is
rationally related to these articulated government
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