- 9 - not have the authority to bind petitioner to what was, in effect, an agreement to extend the limitations period. In so arguing, petitioner compares the petition to a written agreement, such as a Form 872-A, that purports to extend the limitations period but, in fact, is signed by an unauthorized party.11 We disagree with petitioner’s characterization of both the petition and Mr. Berg for the reasons discussed below. Congress originally enacted the predecessor to section 6503(a)(1) as section 277 of the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791, which became section 277 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. In the legislative history of section 277, Congress addressed the effect of a defective petition on the limitations period: The decision dismissing the appeal may not be made until months after the proceeding was begun and there is some question whether in such cases the statute of limitations on assessment is actually suspended during the pendency of the proceeding. It is specifically provided in section 277 that the limitation period shall be suspended, if any proceeding is placed on the docket of the Board, until the decision of the Board in respect thereof becomes final and for 60 days thereafter.[12] 11Sec. 6501(c)(4) authorizes extension agreements between the Secretary and the taxpayer. Pursuant to sec. 6903, the taxpayer may authorize a third party to act as his representative and enter an agreement to extend the limitations period. See Balkissoon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-223, affd. 995 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1993). 12References to the “Board” are to the Board of Tax Appeals, the predecessor of this Court.Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011