- 10 -
H. Rept. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927), 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2)
384, 399-400; see also S. Rept. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1928), 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 409, 431.
In Eversole v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 56 (1966), the
taxpayers contended that the petition, which an improper party
had filed on the estate’s behalf and this Court had dismissed as
to the estate, failed to suspend the limitations period. Relying
on the legislative history of section 277 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, a predecessor of section 6503(a)(1) (quoted supra),
as well as statutory language and relevant case law,13 we held
that the petition suspended the limitations period. Id. at 64-
65. In reaching our conclusion, we found it significant that the
language of section 277 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939
required suspension of the limitations period when a proceeding
“is placed” on the docket rather than when “the taxpayer places”
a proceeding on the docket. Id. at 64.
Petitioner attempts to distinguish Eversole from the instant
case on the basis of the improper party’s relationship to the
13One such case on which we relied was Am. Equitable
Assurance Co. v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1933), affg. 27
B.T.A. 247 (1932). Responding to a similar challenge to the
limitations period, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
concluded that “the mere placing on the docket of the Board of a
proceeding in respect to the deficiency” suspended the
limitations period. Id. at 47. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reasoned that “Congress did not intend to have the
time a proceeding was pending before the Board counted any more
when the decision was a dismissal for want of jurisdiction than
when it was not.” Id.
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