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the Government’s relitigation of the issue presented. United
States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159-164 (1984).
While some lower courts have indicated that the language in
Mendoza is somewhat ambiguous, the Tax Court and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to which this case is appealable,
have both on numerous occasions interpreted Mendoza as holding
that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel may not be invoked
against the Government. Natl. Med. Enter., Inc. v. Sullivan, 916
F.2d 542, 545 (9th Cir. 1990); Black Constr. Corp. v. INS, 746
F.2d 503, 504 (9th Cir. 1984); Kroh v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 383,
402 (1992); McQuade v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 137, 144 (1985);
Barrett-Crofoot Invs. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-59.
c. Judicial Estoppel
Judicial estoppel is a doctrine that prevents parties in
subsequent judicial proceedings from asserting positions
contradictory to those they previously have affirmatively
persuaded a court to accept. United States ex rel. Am. Bank v.
C.I.T. Constr., Inc., 944 F.2d 253, 257-259 (5th Cir. 1991);
Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598-599 (6th Cir.
1982). The Tax Court, as well as the Courts of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, have accepted the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
See Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1997);
Huddleston v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 17, 28-29 (1993).
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