- 38 -
743, 761 (1980), affd. 673 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1982)). It is well
established that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be
applied against the Commissioner in tax cases “‘with the utmost
caution and restraint.’” Kronish v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 684,
695 (1988) (quoting Boulez v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 209, 214-215
(1981), affd. 810 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Further, the
Supreme Court has stated that the Government may not be estopped
on the same grounds as other litigants. OPM v. Richmond, 496
U.S. 414, 419 (1990); Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467
U.S. 51, 60 (1984).
The following conditions must be satisfied before equitable
estoppel will be applied against the Government: (1) A false
representation or wrongful, misleading silence by the party
against whom the opposing party seeks to invoke the doctrine; (2)
an error in a statement of fact and not in an opinion or
statement of law; (3) ignorance of the true facts; (4) reasonable
reliance on the acts or statements of the one against whom
estoppel is claimed; and (5) adverse effects of the acts or
statement of the one against whom estoppel is claimed. See
Kronish v. Commissioner, supra, and cases cited therein. Thus,
the doctrine requires a finding that a claimant relied on the
Government’s representations and suffered a detriment because of
that reliance. Norfolk S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 13, 60
(1995), affd. 140 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 1998).
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