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In that regard, the estate relied on Wilson v. Commissioner,
500 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1974), where the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed and remanded this Court’s denial of a
motion to vacate. The Court of Appeals found that the taxpayer
in that case was not properly represented and held there was a
direct adverse relationship between the taxpayer and her attorney
resulting in a conflict of interest. Id. at 648. Accordingly,
for Wilson v. Commissioner, supra to apply we would have to find
that there was a conflict and that the estate was not properly
represented. Even if it were shown that Mr. Harkavy had a
conflict of interest, that showing, by itself, would not require
the vacating or disregarding of the agreed decision document.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S.
673, 681-682 (1971) made the following observation concerning
consent decrees:
Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a
case after careful negotiation has produced agreement
on their precise terms. The parties waive their right
to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus
save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk
of litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached
normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for the
saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties
each give up something they might have won had they
proceeded with the litigation. Thus the decree itself
cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties
have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the
resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing
purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining
power and skill to achieve. For these reasons, the
scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its
four corners, and not by reference to what might
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