- 21 - examination underlying the present case. Petitioner therefore cannot show reliance on a past audit under Section 530(a)(2)(B). Likewise, petitioner has adduced no evidence of conventions in the hauling industry to establish longstanding industry practice under Section 530(a)(2)(C). The safe havens of Section 530(a)(2) are therefore inapplicable on the record before us. In seeking to establish a reasonable basis for Ludlow’s treatment apart from the safe havens, petitioner quotes from the following definition of “employment status” in Section 530(c)(2): “The term ‘employment status’ means the status of an individual, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, as an employee or as an independent contractor (or other individual who is not an employee).” Petitioner apparently believes that the purported lack of common law control makes its treatment of Ludlow reasonable within the meaning of Section 530 and that the above definition supports this view. Again, however, petitioner’s approach is contrary to controlling statutes and to the facts of this case. As a matter of construction, Section 530(c)(2) defines employment status for purposes of certain provisions of Section 530 not germane here. It does not purport to override or interpret the definition of “employee” in section 3121(d) and related regulations. Hence, Section 530(c)(2) does not render it rational for petitioner toPage: Previous 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011