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income” criterion, without need further to probe for an implied
agreement regarding other benefits such as possession or
enjoyment. The governing documents contain no restrictions that
would preclude decedent himself, acting through Mr. Gulig, from
being designated as a recipient of income from SFLP and Stranco.
Such scenario is consistent with the reach of the right to income
phrase as we described it in Estate of Pardee v. Commissioner, 49
T.C. 140, 148 (1967):
section 2036(a)(1) refers not only to the possession or
enjoyment of property but also to “right to the income”
from property. The section does not require that the
transferor pull the “string” or even intend to pull the
string on the transferred property; it only requires
that the string exist. See McNichol’s Estate v.
Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 671 (C.A. 3, 1959),
affirming 29 T.C. 1179 (1958) * * *
b. Possession or enjoyment
The facts of this case support the finding of an implied
agreement for retained possession or enjoyment. We have
previously considered implicit retention of these benefits under
section 2036(a)(1) in situations involving family limited
partnerships in Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 144
(2000); Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-246;
Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-121; and Estate
of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-242. Although
the instant case is based on limited post-transfer history, due
in part to decedent’s death only 2 months after creation of the
partnership, we conclude that the reasoning underlying those
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