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determine whether the fiduciary duties relied upon by the estate
would genuinely circumscribe use of powers to designate.
The estate summarizes its contentions regarding fiduciary
duties as follows:
Just like Mr. Byrum, Mr. Strangi’s “rights” (whatever
those rights appear to be) were severely limited by the
fiduciary duties of other people who (according to
Byrum) presumably could be counted on the [sic] observe
those restraints against whatever desires they might
otherwise have had to run pell-mell to do the bidding
of the Decedent: (1) Mr. Gulig, who (separate and
apart from his role as attorney-in-fact for
Mr. Strangi) had fiduciary duties to Stranco, whom he
served as manager; (2) the directors of Stranco, who
had fiduciary duties to both Stranco and to SFLP as a
whole; and (3) McLennan County Community College
(“MCCC”), which had rights as a minority shareholder of
Stranco and a fiduciary obligation to enforce such
rights for the benefit of its own beneficiaries as well
as the people of the State of Texas (with the Attorney
General of Texas having the ability to step in to
enforce such rights if MCCC failed in its duties).
* * *
None of the foregoing obligations cited by the estate is
sufficiently on par with those detailed in United States v.
Byrum, supra, to bring the present case within the Supreme
Court’s rationale.
Concerning Mr. Gulig, any fiduciary duties that Mr. Gulig
might have had in his role as manager of Stranco (and thereby of
SFLP) are entitled to comparatively little weight on these facts.
Prior to his instigation of the SFLP/Stranco arrangement, Mr.
Gulig stood in a confidential relationship, and owed fiduciary
duties, to decedent personally as his attorney in fact. Thus, to
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