Robert Terrence Thompson - Page 7

                                        - 6 -                                         
               To summarize:  The general rule of section 152(e)(1) serves            
          to assign the dependency exemption for a child to the custodial             
          parent.  Therefore, because petitioner was the noncustodial                 
          parent, he is not entitled to claim Christopher as his dependent.           
          Id.  In view of the foregoing, we sustain respondent’s                      
          determination on this issue.                                                
               B.  Filing Status                                                      
               As relevant herein, an individual qualifies as a head of               
          household if the individual is not married at the close of the              
          taxable year and maintains as his or her home a household that              
          constitutes for more than one-half of the taxable year, the                 
          principal place of abode of a child of the taxpayer.  See sec.              
          2(b)(1)(A)(i).                                                              
               Although petitioner maintained a residence for Christopher             
          that may have been Christopher’s place of abode during his son’s            
          visits to Chicago, the record does not demonstrate that                     
          petitioner’s residence was Christopher’s principal place of abode           
          for more than half of the year.  Thus, in 1999, Christopher spent           
          only about 146 days with petitioner in Chicago, a period that is            
          considerably less than half of the year.6  In contrast,                     
          Christopher spent more than half of the year with his mother in             

               6  Jan. 1, 1999 through Mar. 3, 1999 constitutes 62 days,              
          and June 13, 1999 through Sept. 5, 1999 constitutes 84 days.                
          Together, these two periods equal 146 days, which is 37 days                
          short of being more than half of the year.                                  





Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011