- 35 -
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 236, 241-242 (1998), affd. without published
opinion 198 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 1999); Trans City Life Ins. Co. v.
Commissioner, 106 T.C. 274, 299 (1996). Where Congress has
expressed its will in reasonably plain terms, those terms must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507
U.S. 99, 104 (1993).
The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined
by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which
that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469
(1992); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991). In
analyzing the plain meaning of section 419A(c)(2), we examine the
section as a whole, with all of its subsections in mind. See
Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233, 237 (1928); Huffman v.
Commissioner, 978 F.2d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1992), affg. in part,
revg. and remanding in part T.C. Memo. 1991-144.
5. The Statute
We begin with the specific language of section 419A(c)(2),
which provides:
The account limit for any taxable year may include a
reserve funded over the working lives of the covered
employees and actuarially determined on a level basis
(using assumptions that are reasonable in the aggregate)
as necessary for–-
(A) post-retirement medical benefits to be
provided to covered employees (determined on the
basis of current medical costs), or
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