Wells Fargo & Company (f.k.a. Norwest Corporation) and Subsidiaries - Page 37




                                                - 37 -                                                  
            (equal to the normal cost computed under the aggregate cost method)                         
            which may be included as a component of the account limit, together                         
            with the amounts set aside for incurred but unpaid claims.                                  
            Respondent concludes, therefore, that section 419A(c)(2) does not                           
            require the computation of the accrued liability.                                           
                  A comparison of the language in section 419A(c)(1) with that                          
            in section 419A(c)(2) belies respondent’s position.  Section                                
            419A(c)(1) provides that the account limit “for any taxable year is                         
            the amount reasonably and actuarially necessary to fund” (emphasis                          
            supplied) incurred but unpaid claims and administrative costs with                          
            respect to such claims.  By contrast, section 419A(c)(2) provides                           
            that the account limit “for any taxable year may include a                                  
            reserve”.                                                                                   
                  Congress could have used identical language in both                                   
            provisions; the fact that Congress chose not to do so must be given                         
            heed.  Cf. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993)                           
            (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a                           
            statute but omits it in another * * *, it is generally presumed                             
            that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate                             
            inclusion or exclusion.” (Internal quotation marks and citation                             
            omitted.)); United States v. $359,500 in U.S. Currency, 828 F.2d                            
            930, 933 (2d Cir. 1987) (“‘contrasting language in similar statutes                         
            may show that the legislature intended different standards of                               
            compliance’” (quoting 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction,                         






Page:  Previous  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011