- 15 -
that can estop the Commissioner from reassessing a deficiency.”
Serv. Bolt & Nut Co. v. Commissioner, 724 F.2d 519, 524 (6th Cir.
1983), affg. 78 T.C. 812 (1982).13
In the same vein, petitioners’ contention that the
abatements constitute an admission on respondent’s part regarding
the amount of the deficiencies simply confuses the concepts of
“assessment” and “deficiency”. While the abatements might be
construed to constitute an admission that the prior assessments
were premature, they in no way constitute admissions as to the
proper amount of the deficiencies. See Pfeifer v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1983-437 (“There is no merit to petitioner’s
contention that the abatement [of a premature assessment] was
determinative of his tax liability.”).
Finally, petitioners’ res judicata and collateral estoppel
claims are utterly frivolous. These doctrines bar parties that
have previously litigated a matter from relitigating the same
matter. See, e.g., Hambrick v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 348, 351
(2002); Peck v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 162, 166 (1988), affd. 904
F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1990). Petitioners have not even alleged,
13 The single case cited by petitioners, Hunt v. United
States, 94 F.Supp. 2d 665 (D. Md. 2000), is readily
distinguishable. There, the Commissioner was equitably estopped
from refusing to pay interest where the taxpayer reasonably and
detrimentally relied on the understanding that he would receive
such interest in settling his Tax Court case and thereby waiving
his right to a deficiency proceeding. Here, petitioners have not
shown, inter alia, that they reasonably or detrimentally relied
on the abatements.
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