- 34 -
in the instant case are different and, accordingly, the
principles of res judicata do not apply in the instant case. See
Hambrick v. Commissioner, supra at 351.
Respondent contends that two cases have already addressed
the central issue in the instant case; i.e., whether the August
15, 1978, notice of deficiency satisfied petitioners’ 1971 tax
liability: Enos v. DeHart, 217 Bankr. 457 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1997),15 and Enos v. United States, Civil Action No. 90-10178-WAG
14(...continued)
argument that the debtor should be subrogated to the
position the IRS has, vis a vis, Enos should be
afforded the debtor. We, therefore, determine that the
facts of this case present a situation in which the
debtor should be subrogated to the position held by the
IRS pursuant to the levy. * * *
15Enos v. DeHart, 217 Bankr. 457, 465 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1997), states:
As was observed earlier, the Enoses are ultimately
liable for the tax and the entire amount of unpaid
interest on tax. Notwithstanding that conclusion, I
recognize the Enoses may argue that by agreeing to
payment terms with Metropolitan, the Internal Revenue
Service exercised such control and dominion over the
account receivable owing the Enoses by Metropolitan
that the Internal Revenue Service may be required to
credit the taxpayer for the full amount of the value of
the receivable levied upon. Barlow’s, Inc. v. United
States, 36 Bankr. 826, 829 (Bank. E.D. Va.), affd. 53
Bankr. 986 (E.D. Va. 1984), affd. 767 F.2d 1098 (4th
Cir. 1985). The impact of such a conclusion on the
Enoses’ future liability would be pivotal.
Nevertheless, in recognizing the Enoses’ overall
liability to pay their taxes, including interest, I
will take no position as to whether they would have any
defenses to such claim. A finding as to the ultimate
availability of various defenses by the Enoses to the
Internal Revenue Service does not appear to be
(continued...)
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