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establishing affirmatively all facts giving rise to our
jurisdiction. See Patz Trust v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 497, 503
(1977). After reviewing the record, we conclude that petitioners
have failed to carry their burden of proof.
Although the trusts’ petitions conformed to Rule 60(a)(1),
and Mr. Norton and Mr. Boatright may have been the proper parties
to petition this Court on behalf of the trusts,22 neither Mr.
Norton nor Mr. Boatright actually petitioned this Court on behalf
of the trusts. Rather, Mr. Izen signed the petitions as counsel
for the Pago and McKenzie Trusts. Petitioners have not shown
that Mr. Norton or Mr. Boatright authorized or ratified the
filing of the petitions on behalf of either trust.
Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure define the means by which a taxpayer
authorizes an attorney to file a petition in this Court. See
sec. 7452; Rule 24. Whether a taxpayer has properly granted an
attorney the authority to petition the Tax Court is a factual
issue governed by the common law principles of agency. Adams v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 359, 369-372 (1985); Kraasch v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 623, 626-629 (1978); Trans World Travel v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-6; John Arnold Executrak Sys., Inc.
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-6. In order to bind the
principal, the agent must have either actual or apparent
22See infra note 23.
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